In a previous post, I reviewed the various positions of four theologgers who have written about the constitution of the person and what happens immediately following death. In this post, I will present my own positions on these two issues that are determinative in plotting a course of action in such difficult situations as Terri Schiavo’s.

Nonreductive Physicalism

I have written in depth – and length! – elsewhere my understanding of the nature of the human constitution. Rather than send you to another site (you can do that later, if you like, or now: I don’t want to tell you how to live your life), I’ll quote some of it here:

The position taken in the present work concerning the nature of the mind-brain connection is nonreductive physicalism. It is physicalism in that all of human nature and experience is understood to be dependent upon human physical existence: apart from the temporary state after death (wherein existence depends upon the special, sustaining activity of God), there is no sense of personhood apart from connection with the physical body.

The position is nonreductive in that the immaterial aspect of human nature cannot be explained by or reduced to physical properties of the body: the activity and properties of the neurons firing in the brain do not explain the existence of such experiences such as faith, hope, or love. In this view, there is more to being a person than can be explained by physical attributes or activities.

What constitutes the human brain is easy to describe: the neurological section above identified what the brain is, how it operates, and how it contributes to human existence. It is not so evident, however, what the mind is.

Negatively speaking, the mind or [spirit] is that dimension of human existence which cannot be explained by the physiology of the brain . . . Nobel laureate Roger Sperry has stated, “The meaning of the message will not be found in the chemistry of the ink;” in the same way, what it means to be a person cannot be explained simply by looking at neurology . . .

That there is a connection between the mind and the brain is well-established. The previously described tragedy of Alzheimer’s Disease illustrates the link, as does the remarkable story of an accident in 1848 involving a young man named Phineas Gage:

“It was the summer in New England. A twenty-five-year-old foreman working for the Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company and described by his employers as ‘most efficient and capable’ was preparing to detonate an explosion in order to remove rock obstructing the path of the railroad. At a crucial moment he looked away when someone called over his right shoulder.

“It was only a brief instant but Phineas Gage turned back and put in his iron bar to begin tamping the powder, not realizing that his assistant had not poured in the sand beforehand. A deafening explosion and the bar, manufactured to Gage’s exact specifications – weighing 13 1/4 pounds, 3 feet 7 inches long, and tapered to a point 1/4 inch in diameter – entered Gage’s left cheek, pierced his skull, traversed the front of his brain, and exited at a high speed through the top of his head. The rod landed more than a hundred feet away, covered with blood and brains.

“The detailed report of the event says that Gage was stunned! Amazingly he was still conscious and made a remarkable recovery. He became a notorious case, appearing in circuses.

“His employers described how, before the accident he was efficient and capable, but afterward his personality had clearly undergone a dramatic change. Not only was he feckless and irresponsible, his likes and dislikes, his aspirations, his ethics and morals, were altered.

“Such findings suggested that it was not just mental events that were linked to brain structures but that there may be systems in the human brain which, if damaged, may alter the personal and social dimensions of normal life.

“Antonio Damasio, in his book Descartes’ Error, concluded his description of Gage’s experience with the provocative question, ‘Is it fair to say that his soul was diminished, or that he had lost his soul?’

“Damasio further documented with contemporary cases the observations made on Gage, demonstrating that it was not a unique observation.” – [Joseph Ledoux in The Emotional Brain.]

As Damasio’s question implies, the reality and experience of being a person is rooted in human physicality and specifically in the human brain. But the brain, while necessary for the existence of the mind or soul, is not sufficient to explain what it means to be a person. Clayton explains that a

“living body and a functioning brain are necessary conditions for personhood, yet the wide discrepancy in the ‘logic’ of the vocabularies suggest that they are not sufficient conditions. Personhood is not fully translatable into ‘lower-level’ terms [that is, properties of the brain]; persons experience causal and phenomenological properties . . . that are uniquely personal.”

This, then, is the position of nonreductive physicalism. The subjective experience of being a person, which is a property of the mind and not the brain, is embedded in and dependent on the physical brain: it is affected by changes in the brain and abides by physical laws and principles.

But the relationship is also reciprocal: even as the soul/mind is affected by the brain, so is the brain affected by the soul. Thus, there is “top-down” causation in the person: while the human being reacts and responds to the influences of the brain, the person has the additional ability to intend behavior and to modify behavior that may have begun in response to a signal to the brain; this ability is separate from and independent of the brain in terms of causation.

It might be said that the human being can be explained in terms of brain activity and properties, but the human person cannot be explained on a neurological basis.

In summary, nonreductive physicalism maintains that people are souls, not that they merely possess a soul. Within the unity, however, are a variety of identifiable and experientially separate aspects. The human spirit – and the Holy Spirit in the believer – utilizes the physical brain to express itself; the brain relies on the human/Holy Spirit for life.

When there is damage to the brain, therefore, the spirit/Spirit is affected, too. An analogy may be useful. Good gasoline (spirit) enables a good engine (body) to function according to design. Bad gasoline (fallen spirit) results in a good engine that is less productive; good gasoline (Holy Spirit) in a bad engine (fallen body or trauma) will similarly produce a less-than intended result.

Life After Life

Rather than risk a misleading or inaccurate paraphrase, I’ll quote extensively from the book that has most influenced my understanding of what happens immediately following death. In Death and the Afterlife, Robert Morey writes:

[Some] confuse the concept of a conscious afterlife with the biblical terms ‘immortality’ and ‘incorruptibility.’ The word ‘immortality’ is found five times in the KJV. The authors of the KJV translated two different Greek words as immortality. They were correct with one word but mistranslated the other.

The first word is athanasia. This is a combination of two Geek words which literally mean ‘no death.’ This word means ‘never-ending existence’ or ‘the state of being incapable of death.’ It is used to describe the resurrection body in 1 Cor 15.43, 53.

The second word is aphtharsia. This is also a combination of two Greek words which literally mean ‘no corruption.’ It means ‘the state of being incapable of corruption, decomposition, or degeneration.’ It is used to describe God in Rom 1.23 and the resurrection body in 1 Cor 15.42, 50, 52-54. The KJV mistranslates it as ‘immortality’ in 1 Tim 1.17 and 2 Tim 1.10.’

While athanasia reveals that the resurrected saints will never experience death, but exist for all eternity, aphtharsia reveals that this will not be a mere eternal existence but the fullest life of joy and satisfaction possible, because the resurrected saints cannot experience any degeneration in the functions of body or mind. No corruption will disrupt the bliss of the eternal state.

Morey – who approaches the entire issue through the tripartite lens of creation, the fall, and redemption – also explains the unnatural and unintended separation of the “soul” from the “body:”

At the fall, man was separated from God, the world, others, and finally, from his own body. The terribly tragic effects of sin ultimately result in the ripping of man’s mind or soul out of his body and his unnatrual continuance as a disembodied spirit in a conscious afterlife.

I differ slightly from Morey at this point. Rather than contend that it is the soul that is torn from the body, I believe that it is the spirit that departs. The spirit, which is also the conduit of temperament, gives life to the body; the loss of the spirit results in the death of the body.

Morey then turns to the phrase “everlasting life” and explores its meaning:

Another frequent error is the assumption that the phrase ‘everlasting life’ refers to ‘unending existence after the resurrection.’ Thus everlasting life is viewed as a quantitative term referring to an eternal or unending existence.

First, the phrase everlasting life, as found in extra-biblical Greek literature, means an endless quality of life which the righteous enjoy now as well as in an afterlife. It refers to the fullness of life, such as joy and peace.

Second, the phrase ‘everlasting life’ in the rabbinic literature refers to an endless quality of life which the righteous receive now as well as in the hereafter. Thus, the Hebraic sense, according to F.F. Bruce, referred to ‘the life of the age to come or the resurrection life’ which was the present possession of the righteous.

Third, at the moment of regeneration (new birth), the saints receive ‘everlasting life’ as a present possession . . . This must be understood as referring not to an eternal duration or quantity of life but to experiencing an endless and abundant quality of life . . .

Fourth, it was a rabbinic tradition to speak of the wicke as ‘dead’ while they were still existing in this world, and to speak of the righteous as possessing ‘life’ from God. In the New Testament, Jesus and the apostles continued this rabbinic tradition by describing unbelievers a ‘dead’ and believers as receiving ‘life’ at the moment of regeneration . . .

It is obvious that ‘life’ does not refer to ‘existence’ any more than ‘death’ refers to ‘nonexistence.’ The wicked are ‘dead’ while they yet exist in this world. The saints do not begin to exist when they are regenerated . . . The life which we receive is described as being ‘eternal.’

“And the witness is this, that God has given us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He who has the Son has the life; he who does not have the Son of God does not have the life.” – 1 Jn 5.11-12

A true believer in vital relationship with Christ can never lose or be robbed of his living relationship to the Lord Jesus Christ. The Apostle Paul speaks of the relationship between Christ and the believer as being incapable of being severed even by death itself.

“For I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.” – Rom 8.38-39

This biblical promise makes soul sleep or annihilationism impossible. The life which a believer receives at the moment of regeneration is to be viewed as lasting forever.

Thus, when Paul says that he would “rather to be absent from the body and to be at home with the Lord” (2 Cor 5.8), he is not talking about some subjective experience. This would certainly not have been what his original audience in Corinth would have understood him as saying, and the Bible simply does not support such a concept.


2 Cor 1:13