An unsettling conversation the other day gave me pause and caused me to explore the issue of divorce and remarriage once again. I have done this in the past and do it periodically because (a) new resources come available almost daily, (b) I forget important aspects of the discussion, and (c) although the teaching of Scripture does not change, my own understanding of the teaching continues to develop and deepen. The last point reflects my conviction of my own fallibility and the need for periodic review of my “intractable” positions.

The conversation occurred when a friend told me of woman at a local church who has taken it upon herself to begin teaching that viewing pornography is tantamount to adultery and, since adultery is grounds for divorce, therefore viewing pornography is a valid reason to divorce. Her biblical basis for the teaching is Mt 5.27-28:

“You have heard that it was said, ‘YOU SHALL NOT COMMIT ADULTERY’; but I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart” (NASB).

This makes sense syllogistically:

All viewing of pornography is adultery.
Adultery is grounds for divorce.
Therefore, viewing of pornography is grounds for divorce.

Of course, what is logical is not always biblical, so it became important (for me, anyway) to examine the question once again. My primary resource for doing so, apart from the Bible, is David Instone-Brewer’s Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible. His book is an in-depth exploration of the cultural and religious context of the NT discussion of the issue of divorce; the context is critical in understanding what Jesus said and, just as importantly, what He did not say in His discourses and debates with His contemporaries.

Instone-Brewer is a research fellow at Tyndale house in Cambridge, England; interestingly, he wrote the book online, welcoming input while pleading for integrity from those who would “borrow” his findings and conclusions. It is an important and vital reference for any or all who find themselves confronted with the possible divorce of fellow believers. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in this series is from his book.

In this series, I hope to address only a few of the many aspects involved in this troubling and all-too prevalent issue. The teachings of Jesus and Paul will be considered along with the context in which those teachings took place, as well as more contemporary interpretations and applications of the passages involved. It is necessary to understand first the background of the NT discussions.

Divorce and Remarriage Customs

There were numerous grounds for divorce at the time of Jesus’ ministry in Judea and the surrounding area, and the list of “valid” reasons was growing. Instone-Brewer traces the development of Jewish teaching on the matter in the first century c.e. and pinpoints the major debate going on at the time.

1. Infertility. According the Jews, the primary purpose of marriage was procreation; this was more true for men than for women, especially in order to produce a male heir and namesake. “One of the 613 laws identified in the Torah by rabbinic Judaism was ‘be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth’ (Gen 1.28). On the basis of this law, all Jews were expected to marry and have children.”

So important was the matter of having children that, if a couple did not have any after ten years of marriage, they were expected to divorce. By the time of the NT, however, this was an accepted grounds for divorce but not mandatory as previously.

2. Unfaithfulness. “Adultery, when it happened, was treated extremely seriously. Theoretically this was still a capital offense in the first century c.e., though there is no record of this ever being applied. The normal punishment was divorce without repayment of the ketubah [This was a dowry paid by the bride’s father to the groom. It remained the property of the bride but was to be used in and for the marriage].”

To prove adultery, however, was a very difficult matter and the application of the death penalty was virtually unknown at the time of Christ. And, while men could divorce their wives for adultery – even suspected adultery or for encouraging adultery even if it did not happen – women could not divorce their husbands for adultery: the law allowing polygamy made it technically impossible for a man to commit adultery. In such cases, the husband did not have to repay the ketubah.

3. Exodus 21.10-11. At first glance, this passage dealing with the rights of a slave would not appear to have much to do with marriage and divorce. Using the argument of the lesser to the greater, however, the rabbis found reasonable expectations for marriage and, by inference, grounds for divorce. The passage in its context is:

“If a man sells his daughter as a female slave, she is not to go free as the male slaves do. If she is displeasing in the eyes of her master who designated her for himself, then he shall let her be redeemed. He does not have authority to sell her to a foreign people because of his unfairness to her. If he designates her for his son, he shall deal with her according to the custom of daughters. If he takes to himself another woman, he may not reduce her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights. If he will not do these three things for her, then she shall go out for nothing, without payment of money.” – Ex 21.7-11

The rabbis understood vv. 10-11 to teach that the slave/wife had a right to food, clothing, and conjugal rights; if it were true for a slave, it was true for a wife; if for a wife, then for a husband, too. Not only did the refusal to provide these three basics allow for a divorce – without the repayment of the ketubah - it also resulted in the divorce certificate closely resembling the “emancipation” certificate for a released slave.

Material neglect referred to the willful withholding of food and clothing, as well as other reasonable aspects of customary support for the needs of the spouse. Refusal constituted grounds for divorce.

Emotional neglect was different. Rather than allowing for divorce, the deliberate withholding of emotional support and nurturing resulted in monetary fines: the longer the sinning spouse refused to comply, the greater the fine. Emotional neglect was not limited to the sexual act: cruelty and public humiliation were also included.

4. “Any Matter”. This was the chief debate during Christ’s lifetime. Advocated by the School of Hillel, it was based on an understanding an unusual phrase in Deu 24.1: ervat davar, or “indecency of a matter.”

“The Hillelites concluded that the strangeness of the phrase suggested that there was an extra meaning hidden in it. This was a common technique in early rabbinic exegesis. They therefore concluded that the two words referred to two different grounds for divorce – “indecency” and “a matter.” This meant one could base a divorce on an act of “indecency” or on “a matter,” which meant ‘any matter’ . . . The Shammaites took the two words to mean ‘a matter of indecency,’ by which they understood the phrase to mean ‘adultery.’”

While the two schools debated the meaning of this phrase, it is important to note that both accepted the three grounds for divorce based on Ex 21.10-11.

During the first century C.E., the preferred means – and “most righteous” means – was the “any matter” divorce.

“Joseph, the father of Jesus, was also planning to use a Hillelite ‘any matter’ divorce. Matthew records that Jospeh wished to avoid bringing shame on Mary and to divorce her quietly (Mt 1.19). An ‘any matter’ divorce required no public trial, no evidence brought by witnesses, and very little fuss. Matthew says that Joseph was planning this because he was a righteous man.”

Remarriage of widows and divorced women was normal and assumed. In fact, the widows and divorcees were actually free for the first time in their lives: the certificate and law said that they were free to marry whomever they chose to marry – except her lover or the person with whom she was suspected of having committed adultery, her former husband, or a priest. More than a few women chose to remain single, however, since they had more legal rights than their married counterparts. In addition, they were often quite well off financially following the death of their husband or after a divorce.

Unlike our own times, there was no social stigma attached to marrying either a widow or a divorcee.

If, however, the divorce was found to be invalid (or the husband to be living rather than deceased), then remarriage was adulterous. The consequences for this were considerable. Instone-Brewer explains,

“There were a few circumstances where a woman could remarry without being properly divorced or widowed, or without having been properly married. Although these cases must have been rare, they were treated with utmost seriousness because she was technically guilty of adultery or fornication. Even though she was only ‘technically’ guilty, she suffered the same consequences as if she had been deliberately immoral.

“This was not the same as crimes that were considered morally equivalent to adultery, such as lust or touching a woman. In those cases, although the person was considered to be morally guilty of adultery, there was no mention of punishment.”

Illegitimate marriages resulted in the descendants of the union – whether a new marriage or a remarriage – to be regarded as illegitimate for the next ten generations, and children from a marriage following an illegitimate divorce were also considered illegitimate.

Next: The Teaching of Jesus


2 Cor 1:13